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ABSTRACT
Based upon a series of interviews with art market experts, this
Article identifies and answers a significant, yet previously unexplored
economics puzzle affecting the art market. Economics suggests that
markets typically produce efficiency and social wealth, but when they
fail, most actors should prefer remedial measures over an inefficient
status quo. The art market currently is, and has been, plagued with
frauds, thefts, forgeries, and market failure-a state of affairs that the
governing legal framework has made worse. Despite this, the art
market seems to adamantly, and puzzlingly, defend its business
culture, rejecting attempts to remedy inefficiencies. In other words,
why has the art industry remained stable, yet fraught with market
failure?
The research herein finds that reliable product information is
the lifeblood of efficient markets, yet the nature of art encourages many
participants to withhold or conceal important market information.
This often prevents prospective buyers from accurately determining a
work's value, leading to inefficient behavior. Few actors have sought
change, however, because the economics of art produces a special
conflict of interest: buyers expect art to appreciate in value and thus
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assume they will resell the work at a higher price, causing them to
prefer a market favoring the sellers. This observation suggests that
efficient markets require buyers and sellers to be sufficiently adverse or
else incur stark inefficiencies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Economic principles inform the laws of property and
commerce.1 The overarching theory is that unregulated markets
generally maximize collective wealth and social benefits. 2 This does
1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 369-71 (8th ed. 2011)
(discussing how cartels and price fixing produce undesirable economic, and thus societal,
externalities, and how the Sherman Act sought to regulate these inefficient market behaviors,
including monopolies, price-fixing, cartels, and collusion, with criminal and civil penalties).
2. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 27 (2004) ("[T]he standard economic assumption [is]
that in competitive markets, marginal private benefits equal marginal social benefits, and
marginal private costs equal marginal social costs. This means that self-interest equals the
public interest, and that there are no negative or positive externalities from market exchange...
. The same idea dates back all the way back to Adam Smith and his notion of the invisible hand.
Smith argued, for instance, that when individuals pursue their own self-interest, they end up
promoting the public interest even though it is not part of their original intention.") (internal
footnotes omitted).
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not happen in every instance,3 as sometimes markets create harmful
externalities 4 or poorly distribute resources.5 Incidents of "market
failure"6 should not last long though, considering that a number of
actors-including buyers, sellers, voters, and local officials-have
incentives to remedy inefficiency. 7 Indeed, most market participants
should prefer remedial laws and economic regulations over a
suboptimal status quo.8 A corollary is that markets existing without
disruption have most likely produced a desirable sum of wealth and
efficiency 9 or otherwise, those negatively affected would have sought
change. In that case, why has the art market remained stable yet
fraught with stunning inefficiency?
This Article finds that in contrast to efficient markets, the art
industry actively suppresses reliable information about its
3. "Pareto efficiency" or "Pareto optimality" is an economic theory defining optimal
market efficiency, occurring when "no one can be made better off without making someone else
worse off." David Ellerman, Numeraire Illusion: The Final Demise of the Kaldor-Hicks Principle,
in THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 96, 96 (Mark D. White ed., 2009). This
means that the status quo of all parties achieves maximum benefits and any changes to the
relationship would then begin to harm one party. Id.
4. An example of a negative economic externality is pollution when the buyer and
seller do not have to pay for the pollution that their transaction has created and thus have an
incentive to engage in behavior where the end result is negative if the cost of pollution exceeds
the public benefit created by their deal. See Michael J. Podolsky, Note, The Use of Discount Rate
in EPA Enforcement Actions, 52 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2002) ("Regulations are
imposed to correct for market failures such as negative externalities. In the context of pollution,
negative externalities exist as firms fail to internalize the external cost of pollution as a result of
their production process. Consequently, the quantity of goods and services consumed exceeds the
optimal level. The optimal level is where the marginal social benefits equal marginal social
costs.").
5. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 39-41 (2000) (explaining that
market inefficiencies in developing nations has produced "$9.3 trillion of dead capital," meaning
that these assets cannot achieve optimal value).
6. There is not necessarily one agreed upon definition of "market failure," though one
can view it as a collective problem whereby the system fails "to overcome problems of collective
action-that is, situations in which individual incentives lead to inefficient collective outcomes."
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PEOPLE'S POWER,
PREFERENCES, AND PERCEPTIONS 136-37 (3d ed. 2006).
7. Buyers, sellers, voters and local officials all have an incentive to remedy these
inefficiencies. Economists have said that legislation exists in a market whereby a law is most
likely to be enacted by a legislature when a significant demand for it exists. This demand should
naturally occur when a majority of affected parties feel harmed by the status quo. See POSNER,
supra note 1, at 716 (mentioning that the electoral process "creates a market for legislation in
which legislators 'sell' legislative protection to those who can help their electoral prospects with
money or votes").
8. See id.
9. See Sandra Marco Colino, On the Road to Perdition? The Future of the European Car
Industry and Its Implications for EC Competition Policy, 28 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 35, 76 (2007)
(explaining that if markets are acting efficiently, then any subsequent regulation can then upset
the market, or another market, creating market failure).
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products-a behavior that the governing legal regime reinforces.' 0 For
instance, art dealers and sellers often withhold most product and sales
data in order to drive up prices artificially." This becomes even more
troublesome when taking into account the legal pitfalls facing an
uninformed buyer. 12 A purported Matisse could have been forged 13 or
stolen, 14  either of which condition threatening the buyer's
investment. 15 Victims of forgeries also have little legal recourse
against the seller 16 or anyone else,1 7 and those who have purchased a
stolen painting must usually return it without compensation
10. A primary function of efficient markets is providing adequate information to buyers
and sellers. This consideration informs many economic regulatory laws. See Robert A. Brown,
Financial Reform and the Subsidization of Sophisticated Investors' Ignorance in Securitization
Markets, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 105, 146-47 (2010) ("The Dodd-Frank Bill (and a lot of legal
commentary) has as its core the idea that the lack of information between investors and issuers
of securities was a primary contributing factor to the Market Meltdown .... The dominant theory
about market failure is Nobel Prize winner George Akerlofs seminal work, which describes the
problem of information asymmetries as a 'Lemons Problem.' Akerlof concludes that market
failure can occur where sellers cannot communicate costlessly to buyers the value of their
products.") (footnotes omitted).
11. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, Former Chairman, International Foundation
of Art Research's Law Advisory Council, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2013) (explaining that when
little information exists about the typical value of an contemporary artist's work, dealers seek to
avoid public sales, such as auctions, because if the work is sold at a lower price, the dealer will be
unable to sell the works again for the higher price; thus, dealers prefer to repress information to
keep prices high).
12. See infra Part III (explaining the three predominant problems facing perspective
buyers).
13. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 94, 95-98 (D. Mass. 1987)
(finding that the buyer of a painting that later turned out to be a forgery did not have a cause of
action against the seller, despite the fact that the painting is now worth a fraction of its purchase
price of $11,250, because it was barred by the statute of limitations).
14. See, e.g., Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300, 302-11 (D.R.I. 2007) (finding
that owners of a painting which later turned out to be stolen must give the painting back to
original owners, who had it stolen from them during World War I1).
15. See id. at 311 (granting the original owners motion of replevin, divesting the current
holders of art of both legal and possessory rights to the painting).
16. See, e.g., Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that no
fiduciary duty typically exists between buyers and dealers wherein a buyer purchased a
painting, later found out that it was a forgery, and sued the dealer claiming that the dealer had
breached a fiduciary duty to him).
17. Many who suspect that their works are forged determine for a number of reasons
that it makes little sense to bring an action against any culpable party that caused the buyer to
purchase the forged art. For instance, the costs of investigating the art's authenticity can exceed
its value; the culpable party may be judgment proof so that determining that the work is a
forgery will serve only to diminish the value of the buyer's painting; some countries destroy
forgeries and because of that, buyers may prefer to keep the forged painting than have it be
destroyed; or even that one discovers that their painting is a forgery long after the perpetrator
has been found liable in a civil and/or criminal trial. See Riah Pryor, Victims of Forgery are 'Left
in Limbo,' ART NEWSPAPER, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.theartnewspaper.comlarticlesNictims-of-
forgery-are-left-in-limbo/27146.
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regardless of the generations passed since the theft occurred.18 Even
the most diligent art consumer cannot typically access enough reliable
information to determine with confidence whether a proposed art deal
is a wise investment.
19
The dangers belying a buyer were recently illustrated by one of
New York's most well known and storied private galleries, Knoedler &
Company, which, as it turns out, had sold forged paintings for over a
decade. 20 A local man had authored the forgeries in a nearby Queens
garage, selling them to Knoedler as authentic Rothkos and Jackson
Pollocks,21 producing as much as $40 million in gallery profits. 22 Even
if Knoedler was duped,23 the fact that such a scandal could surface at
Knoedler suggests that no transaction can ever rise above scrutiny.
24
Notwithstanding the Knoedler debacle and other prior scandals, few
in the art industry have seriously attempted to add transparency to
the art market.
25
But despite these flaws, consumers continue to invest
substantial sums of money in art.26 While some think of the art
market as a niche industry for the rich, it actually entails a significant
18. See, e.g., Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981) (finding that a merchant's
defective title would not be protected even if he was duped because he did not make his purchase
in good faith); Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 820 (1966).
19. See infra Part II (explaining the crucial role of information in effective markets and
the related problems posed by the art market).
20. For a more detailed discussion of events, see Michael Shnayerson, A Question of
Provenance, VANITY FAIR, May 2012, http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/O5/knoedler-
gallery-forgery-scandal-investigation.
21. See Patricia Cohen & William K. Rashbaum, One Queens Painter Created Forgeries
that Sold for Millions, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/
16/nyregionlone-queens-painter-created-forgeries-that-sold-for-millions-us-says.html.
22. Patricia Cohen, Lawsuits Claim Knoedler Made Huge Profits on Fakes, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/22/arts/design/knoedler-made-huge-profits-on-
fake-rothko-lawsuit-claims.html.
23. See Michael Shnayerson, What Does Glafira Rosales's Guilty Plea in the Knoedler-
Gallery Forgery Case Mean for Ann Freedman and the Rest of the Players?, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 1,
2013, 12:52 PM), http://www.vanityfair.comlonline/daily/2013/10/glafira-rosales-guilty-plea-
knoedler.
24. See id.
25. See generally Owen C. Pell, The Potential for a Mediation/Arbitration Commission
to Resolve Disputes Relating to Artworks Stolen or Looted During World War 11, 10 DEPAUL-LCA
J. ART & ENT. L. 27, 53 (1999) ("Furthermore, as the present system lacks transparency,
controversies arise and parties must engage in costly litigation."); Stephanie B. Turner, The
Artist's Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329,
350 (2012) ("The information problem can be traced to the 'wall of silence' that surrounds the art
market. As this Part shows, secrecy norms dominates both private sales and public auctions,
making information about art transactions difficult, if not impossible, to come by.").
26. See David D'Arcy, Big Money Still Being Spent on Works of Art Despite World's
Traumas, NATIONAL (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/artfbig-money-still-
being-spent-on-works-of-art-despite-worlds-traumas.
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portion of the value of goods bought and sold in the United States.27
The auction house Sotheby's, for example, estimates that it facilitated
sales of art worth approximately $5.4 billion in 2012.28 Even during
the heart of the recession in 2009, the sale of fine art in the United
States rose to about $1.3 billion.29 Buyers of art, it seems, have not
been dismayed.
This Article explores why market failure persists in the art
world even though sophisticated parties appear to have both the
motivation and ability to demand efficiency. Part II argues that a
market will remain perpetually riddled with inefficiency when buyers
and sellers harbor similar preferences, undermining arm's length
dealing. Part III traces current theories of markets and regulation in
order to create a framework explaining how the law should ideally
intersect with trade. Part IV explains in greater detail the historical
and current state of the art market, as well as the laws governing it.
Part V proposes reforms to remedy the art market's failure and
inefficiency.
II. ART AND THE ECONOMICS OF THE MARKET
The art trade and the laws regulating it behave very differently
from efficient markets. Economists define market efficiency as a
condition in which goods sell at a price incorporating all available
information. 30 This process occurs through an interaction between
buyers and sellers whereby sellers price a good and then survey the
market in hopes of finding consumers willing to spend that much. 31 If
no buyer agrees to that price, then the sellers must reduce its cost; the
27. See id.
28. Souren Melikian, Art Market Goes Hot and Cold, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2013,
http:/www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/arts/3Oiht-melikian30.html.
29. ART MARKET INFORMATION, http://www.artmarket.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
30. See Michelle N. Comeau, Comment, The Hidden Contradiction within Insider
Trading Regulation, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1275, 1295 (2006) ("In its purest form, market efficiency is
simply a positive description of how a capital market may adapt to information. If a capital
market is efficient, stock prices should fully reflect all available information. Furthermore, the
price of shares should immediately adjust to new information that is relevant to a stock's value.
The value of maintaining an efficient market lies in the market's ability to properly allocate
investment resources.").
31. See Kevin S. Marshall, Free Enterprise and the Rule of Law: The Political Economy
of Executive Discretion (Efficiency Implications of Regulatory Enforcement Strategies), 1 WM. &
MARY BuS. L. REV. 235, 262-63 (2010) (noting that firms are willing to spend more producing a
good as its value increases and firms will produce the good as long they can receive more for the
goods than it costs to make it).
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point at which buyers and sellers agree establishes the good's market
value.32
The role of knowledge assumes a crucial function in the
market. 33 Just because a buyer and a seller reach an agreement does
not mean that the market has functioned efficiently since either actor
could have labored under a serious misconception or lacked
information that would have shed light on a bad deal. Accordingly
"market failure" refers to a process by which information asymmetries
cause buyers and sellers to misallocate resources, resulting in
systemic inefficiencies. 34  Consumers who continuously spend too
much on a good, for instance, will have fewer resources to purchase
other products and services, harming both themselves and alternative
vendors.
35
Another important aspect of a good's price is the transaction
cost required to obtain reliable information about it.36 Transaction
costs entail all of the resources one must expend beyond the good's
32. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 15 ("The economic value of a good or service is how
much someone is willing to pay for it or, if he has it already, how much money he demands for
parting with it."); Marshall, supra note 31, at 263 ("Since each price reflects the value of each
product to the marginal buyer, and since each price equals the cost of the marginal unit of
output, consumer welfare is maximized .... ").
33. See Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe
for the Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1984) (discussing the efficient market
hypothesis with respect to Capital formation). Dennis notes that a market that absorbs and
reflects plentiful information is more efficient and thus desirable:
The model posits that the price of a security reflects all publicly available
information about a firm, and that prices react almost instantaneously and in
an unbiased manner to any new information. These two notions are obviously
interrelated. If share prices always reflect all publicly available information,
then prices must adjust promptly to any new data. As a normative matter, a
market that operates in the manner described by the model is economically
desirable because investment will be channeled into the most profitable areas
and capital will be allocated efficiently.
Id.
34. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 13 ("When resources are being used where their value
is highest, or, equivalently, when no reallocation would increase their value, we say they are
being employed efficiently."); Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The
Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179, 205 (1988) (arguing that market inefficiency can
actually result out of free market competition when significant information asymmetries exist,
and that this type of inefficiency is especially ripe in health care).
35. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 13. The health industry is notorious for market failure
because most consumers lack the knowledge to make wise medical decisions independently. See
Greaney, supra note 34, at 204-05. Without strict market regulations, charlatan doctors could
convince patients that they require unnecessary procedures, redirecting a disproportionate sum
of societal resources to an undeserving location. See Greaney, supra note 34, at 205.
36. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 4 ("Information is costly, and often the costs are
prohibitive, especially when the information one would like to have concerns the future.").
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sticker price to complete a deal.3 7 For example, two vendors could
both sell a television set for one-hundred dollars, but if the first
vendor charges a ten-dollar delivery fee while the other delivers for
free, then the latter television set is actually ten dollars cheaper. To
some degree all transactions bear a cost considering that consumers
must spend time, money, or other resources to research, purchase,
retrieve, and install the good.38 The cost of obtaining such information
can sometimes be so great that buyers will either avoid the deal in the
first place or pay much more than necessary.3 9
Accordingly, the foundation of an efficient market lies in its
ability to provide reliable information at a reasonable cost so that
buyers and sellers can dedicate resources to their, wisest, most
efficient uses. 40 Consider again the market for televisions: The ease
with which consumers (and sellers) can acquire information needed to
appraise a television's value promotes the industry's performance.
Indeed, consumers are able to comparison shop amongst vendors,
consult reference magazines like Consumer Reports,41 consider online
user reviews, and in some instances acquire wholesale prices and
dealer invoices-any of these sources potentially providing enough
information to determine a television's fair market value. 42
Most developed legal systems thus encourage efficiency by
either requiring those with reliable information to disseminate it or
forbidding them from concealing it. 43 The laws governing corporate
37. Posner defines a transaction cost as "the costs involved in organizing economic
activity through voluntary exchange." Id. at 529.
38. See, e.g., id. at 4; John F. Barry III, The Economics of Outside Information and Rule
10B-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1335-36 (1981) (explaining that a system to trade stocks
generally performed better than average, however, the number of transactions required to make
the system effective incurred such transaction costs to eliminate its benefits).
39. Posner uses the example of a farmer contemplating raising a hog on his land versus
other possible uses of the land. POSNER, supra note 1, at 42. Depending upon transaction costs
involved, such as property rights and incomplete information regarding whether the hog will
reach maturity, rational actors will choose options or avoid others depending upon those costs.
Id.
40. See id. at 8 ("Economics is primarily concerned with how resources are allocated.").
41. See, e.g., CONSUMER REPORTS MAGAZINE, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/
magazine/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
42. See, e.g., Consumer Reviews, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gplhelp/customer/
display.html?nodeId=12177361 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (explaining how their user reviews
are meant to help consumers assess whether to purchase a good).
43. Professor Romano presents a good example of vehicular "lemons." Roberta Romano,
Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 1002 (1984). Here, if consumers
cannot (at a reasonable cost) discern a well-functioning car from a lemon, then dealers may try to
sell lemons under the auspices of a good car. Id. Buyers may expect this then, and thus, only pay
the price of the lemon (or refuse to buy a car). Id. Accordingly, the value of automobiles would
plummet, especially considering that sellers would then stop selling higher value cars. Id.; see
also POSNER, supra note 1, at 141 (stating that laws that require disclosure often occur when
consumers cannot readily or cheaply acquire information themselves).
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fiduciary duties, for instance, require that when a board of directors
asks its shareholders to vote on a proposed merger, the board must
disclose all material information on the deal, as opposed to compelling
individual shareholders to ferret out the terms of the deal. 44 The
policy rationale is that corporate-disclosure laws help shareholders
maximize the value of their ownership and thus promote societal
wealth and market performance. 45  Efficient legal systems thus
encourage the proper distribution of resources, usually by increasing
the volume and quality of market information.
46
III. THE PERPLEXING TRADE OF ART
Upon this canvas, the laws governing the art market make
little sense. When purchasing art, consumers must be concerned with
three questions: (1) whether the work's value equals at least what the
seller is asking, (2) whether the work is authentic, and (3) whether
anyone else can claim title to the work. 47 The art industry refuses,
however, to provide reliable information about these issues due in part
to the nature of art as a commodity, the culture and history of the
market, and the laws governing its trade. In fact, these same
conditions create incentives to actively conceal these qualities, thereby
driving the art market into a state of market failure.
A. Evaluating the Deal
The nature of art as a tangible commodity makes it difficult for
consumers to accurately assess a particular work's value, leading to
several inefficient consequences. Traditional commodities like a
television, for example, are utilitarian and thus have an inherent
value influenced by its component parts and labor.48 Most consumers
also buy televisions on the primary market (i.e., new) from established
dealers who sell in bulk through a vast number of dealers, creating
intra-industry competition. All of these characteristics allow
consumers to compare television prices, disseminating reliable
44. See Romano, supra note 43, at 1001-02 (explaining that the disclosure requirements
also help the market by providing relevant information to potential buyers outside the
corporation).
45. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 613, 616 (1988).
46. For example, a lively debate is ongoing with respect to whether insider trading
should remain illegal considering it allows stocks to better incorporate reliable information about
their value. See, e.g., Comeau, supra note 30, at 1300.
47. See infra Part III.
48. See Marshall, supra note 31, at 262-63 (explaining that producers will only sell a
good above the marginal cost to create it).
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consumer information.49  While perfect information almost never
exists, most markets provide enough information to effectuate wise
decision-making. 50
In contrast, artists have not historically produced works of art
in bulk as fungible commodities; original paintings, drawings, and
sculptures have traditionally existed as unique, individually produced
works (although this concept has begun to erode with the advent of
"Pop Art" in the second half of the twentieth century).51 Even prints,
lithographs, and other works produced serially or in multiples
generally decrease in value and marketability if they are not produced
as part of a limited edition of finite number. 52 Thus, a consumer who
seeks a specific original painting or limited print must buy that
piece. 53 The primary market for original works produced by living
artists is relatively small.54 The secondary resale market for art is
much larger.55 This is true even for rare masterworks. 56 Although
some dealers operate public galleries, most conduct their business
privately and confidentially.5 7 Indeed, dealers typically serve only as
middlemen in that they work for the seller, instructed to quietly find a
buyer who agrees to keep the deal out of the public's eye.58
The result of this business culture is a difficult process that
consumers must navigate to appraise art. Several qualities influence
a painting's price-including its authorship, aesthetic value, and
49. See Leigh Richards, What are the Characteristics of a Competitive Market's
Structure?, HOUSTON CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/characteristics-competitive-
markets-structure-23832.html (explaining that many buyers and sellers and homogenous
products constitute a competitive market) (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
50. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the act of "absorbing and using"
information is costly and thus, maximum information is not necessarily optimal).
51. See Interview with William G. Pearlstein, Partner, Golenbock Eiseman Assor Bell &
Peskoe, LLP, N.Y.C., N.Y. (Mar. 13, 2013) (explaining that-considering the art market as a
whole--only a relatively small number of original works are sold directly by a living artist (or the
artist's estate) through a primary dealer while the vast majority of art market transactions








58. See Katya Kazakina, Bargain Warhols, Secrecy Bring Collectors to Private Art Sales,
BLOOMBERG (July 27, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=apWHlzppIlaM ("Private sales compose the most opaque segment of the
largely unregulated art market. The secrecy that makes these deals appealing to clients also
precludes most participants from revealing any specifics about the transactions. Such deals also
allow collectors to have control over prices 'at the time when price points are very difficult to
determine,' Dolman said. 'People are happy to negotiate and walk away from a transaction' if the
agreement isn't reached, he added." (quoting Edward Dolman, CEO, Christie's International)).
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significance-yet none of these attributes possesses an inherent value
that can help a common buyer estimate a piece's worth.5 9 Buyers
cannot reference a painting's component parts to approximate its
value and, because most works of art are unique, singular
commodities, buyers cannot rely upon the aggregation of a thousand
sales to inform the transaction.60 Instead they must depend upon an
expert's subjective determination of a work's beauty, influenced by the
reputation of the artist who created it, to determine its value.
61
Franklin Feldman, the Chairman of the International Foundation for
Art Research (IFAR), explained that in some instances people have
paid nearly $30,000 for what appears to be a watercolor sketch
because it was likely painted by Jackson Pollock, yet many more
aesthetically pleasing works have sold for significantly less. A work's
estimated value is really a black box, 62 wherein the process used by
experts to appraise a painting's value is largely unavailable to the
common consumer.
63
Problematically, many in the art market have chosen to exploit
this informational asymmetry, rendering appraisal information even
harder to uncover. For example, most modern artists and dealers
dislike using auction houses because their public nature provides
reliable information about the value of art or a specific piece.
64
Instead some artists prefer private dealers so as to not set an
undesirable price range. 65  In situations where an auction is
necessary, some sellers have resorted to hiring agents to bid up
prices. 66
It is also commonplace for dealers to create serious conflicts of
interest under the dual agency problem. 67 Few in the art industry
consider it inappropriate for a dealer to represent both the buyer and
seller during the same transaction, even if the dealer has opted not to
59. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
60. The fact that a work rarely sells more than once over a period of twenty years
frustrates attempts by buyers to estimate a work's value. See JOHN BUTLER, ART AS INVESTMENT
9 (1984).
61. See WILLIAM D. GRAMPP, PRICING THE PRICELESS: ART, ARTISTS, AND ECONOMICS
37-38 (1989).
62. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
63. See id.; see also John G. Steinkamp, Fair Market Value, Blockage, and the Valuation
of Art, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 362 (1994) ("Determining fair market value often requires an
expert's appraisal.").
64. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
65. See id.
66. See id.




VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:3:457
inform either party about her dual interest. 68 The problem is that the
preferences of the buyer and seller often diverge-buyers would like to
pay the lowest possible price while the seller seeks the opposite. 69 In
turn, a dealer who represents the seller will have few incentives to
discover and disclose defects in a work's title or challenges to its
authenticity. 0 This dynamic gained notoriety in a lawsuit against the
powerful art dealer, Larry Gagosian, where Gagosian was alleged to
have played both sides-inflating prices when he had a greater stake
in selling but undervaluing works when he could make more from
purchasing. 1 Much of the art market's efficiencies thus stems from
the manner in which dealers have access to some of the best
68. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, Gagosian Suit Offers Rare Look at Art Dealing, N.Y.
TIMES ARTS BEAT (Nov. 7, 2012, 5:50 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/
07/gagosian-suit-offers-rare-look-at-art-dealing. A recent lawsuit brought against the powerful
art dealer Larry Gagosian, accused him of striking deals with both the buyer and seller. See id.
Gagosian replied by admitting his role as intermediary with dual interests, yet defended his
claim in part by stating that this is common practice and nothing that he had ever considered
inappropriate. See id. Coverage of a deposition in the case noted that
Mr. Gagosian said that he frequently represented both the seller and buyer in a deal
without disclosing that fact to either party. "To be honest with you, the question
hardly ever gets asked," he said. "I never get asked the question, [a]re you
representing both sides." When asked whether, in a consignment agreement, Mr.
Gagosian felt "any duty of loyalty whatsoever to the seller," he replied: "I just don't
think about it in terms of - in those terms. I think about, 'It's a financial transaction,
and the seller wants to get paid.' My objective is to pay the seller and to make a profit
for the gallery." [Furthermore,] [oln Wednesday the gallery called the claims baseless
and said its "practices are fully consistent with both the law and the standards in the
art world."
Id.
69. See Aaron Cahall, Real Estate Double Agents Represent Buyer and Seller, COLUM.
NEWS SERVICE (May 8, 2007), http://jscms.jrn.columbia.educns/2007-05-08/cahall-
doubleagents.html (explaining that representing both buyer and seller-a practice known as
dual agency-can create an impermissible conflict of interest, whereby at least one party can
suffer harm).
70. For a discussion of the problems posed by dual agency, Rosenbaum presents a
discussion of its problem in the horse market. R. Kelley Rosenbaum, Note, Mucking Out the
Stalls: How Krs S 230.357 Promises to Change Custom and Facilitate Economic Efficiency in the
Horse Industry, 95 KY. L.J. 997, 1004 (2007) ("In the court's opinion, since the object of each
agent on either side of the transaction was to obtain the best bargain for their principal the
'temptation to violate [the agent's] duty to one or both is too great."' (citing Lloyd v. Colston &
Moore, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 587, 588 (1869))).
71. See Cohen, The New Blow in Art Clash of Titans, supra note 67 ('Mr. Perelman had
charged in his papers that Mr. Gagosian took advantage of him, 'undervaluing works when
purchasing them, overvaluing them when selling them, and pocketing the substantial
differential."'); Priscilla Frank, Ronald Perelman and Larry Gagosian Sue Each Other, Wage War
over Jeff Koons $4 million 'Popeye, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 2012, 5:54 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/13[billionaire-businessman-r-n-1880728.html.
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evaluative information yet put themselves into position to profit from
either withholding or obfuscating it.72
Making matters worse, the art market has fostered a culture of
secrecy, conducting deals under the strictest confidentiality. 73 These
norms make it taboo for buyers to ask sellers questions about a work's
purchase history, prior owners, and place of origin.74 Acceptable
buyers must abide by this code, understanding that even
million-dollar sales frequently occur informally, structured as an "as
is" transaction.75 In Hoffman v. L & M Arts,76 for example, the seller
required as a condition of sale that the buyer keep the seller's identity
a secret. The buyer then sold the painting to Sotheby's which later
divulged the original owner's identity in order to substantiate the
painting's provenance.7 7 The original owner sued the first buyer for
breaching the agreement and then Sotheby's for tortious interference
with a contract.78 Consequently these confidentiality agreements
further reduce available information regarding the amount paid by
previous owners for specific paintings or even comparable works. In
turn, buyers must often rely upon the dealer's asking price to form an
opinion about the work's value.79  Oddly, even substantial art
transactions often employ fewer contract documents than other
similarly priced goods. 80 The point is that although efficient markets
require plentiful and reliable information, the nature of art, along
with the culture of its trade, has made this information particularly
hard to obtain. And this analysis has yet to account for further issues
in authenticity and thievery.
72. Economists would argue that the dealers are not acting nefariously, as it is an
overly normative term. Here they are simply acting rationally by responding to the market's
incentives structures and acting accordingly.
73. See Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal
Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 386 (1995).
74. See Porter v. Wertz, 21 N.E.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. 1981) (rejecting a buyer's defense that
it is industry custom to avoid asking questions).
75. See Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to
Valuable Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631, 662 (2000) ("The pervasive secrecy of the art trade
is another reason why buyers and collectors need to take independent and informed precautions.
One scholar has related that the most striking thing to a lawyer who comes upon the art world is
the assumption that transactions should normally be, and are certainly entitled to be, secret.").
76. Hoffman v. L & M Arts, 774 F. Supp. 2d 826 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
77. Id. at 829.
78. Id. at 831.
79. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
80. See Interview with Judith Wallace, Counsel, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn LLP, in
N.Y.C., N.Y. (Mar. 12, 2013).
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B. The Art Market, Information, and Thievery
Much as the nature of art complicates its valuation and sale,
the number of potentially stolen works available on the market also
produces significant inefficiencies. Because many buyers fear that
publicizing their collections will invite criminals to steal from themS1
and few owners have the wherewithal to protect against sophisticated
art thieves or the requisite insurance to guard against losses, many
patrons hire intermediaries to conduct art transactions without using
names or revealing identities.8 2 This desire for secrecy has influenced
behavior to the point where victims of art theft seldom contact the
police out of concern that publicizing the crime will signal to other
criminals that they possess vulnerable art.8 3 Reporting the crime also
renders retrieving stolen art more difficult by driving it
underground.8 4 Even some high-end institutional buyers, such as
museums, prefer to operate quietly without insuring valuable
paintings from theft.85
This fear is not paranoia;8 6 it is often noted that stolen art
constitutes the third most commonly traded illicit good after arms and
drugs (though Interpol states that exact figures are unavailable).8 7
The FBI has even dedicated a special unit to tracking art theft88 and
81. See Interview with Ronald Spencer, Counsel, Carter Ledyard, & Milburn LLP, in
N.Y.C., N.Y. (Mar. 12, 2013) (discussing the incentives about secrecy and the fear of theft).
82. See id. (noting that even most museums do not have the requisite insurance to
protect against theft).
83. Amy Zelcer, Matthew Taylor, the FBI Art Crime Team, and the Law of Stolen
Chattels, Am. CRIM. L. REV. (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/
Drupallblogs/blog-entry/matthew-taylor-fbi-art-crime-team-and-law-stolen-chattels- 10-03-2011.
84. See, e.g., Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 428 (N.Y. 1991)
("[Tihe [museum] did not inform other museums, galleries or artistic organizations of the theft,
and additionally, did not notify the New York City Police, the FBI, Interpol or any other law
enforcement authorities. The museum asserts that this was a tactical decision based upon its
belief that to publicize the theft would succeed only in driving the gouache further underground
and greatly diminishing the possibility that it would ever be recovered.").
85. Id. at 431; Les Christie, Much Money in Munch?, CNNMoNEY.COM (Aug. 23, 2004,
4:51 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2004/O8/23/pf/munchtheft ("The Munch paintings, the London
Times reported, were uninsured against theft. That's not unusual in the art-exhibition world --
the Gardner works weren't insured, either. 'Many museums can't afford the exorbitant premiums
that insurers would have to charge for coverage of these priceless paintings,' [Katie] Dugdale
says."); see, e.g., Paige Williams, The Gardner Heist: 20 Years Later, BOSTON MAG. (Mar. 2010),
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/2OlO/03/gardner-heist (discussing a $200 million theft of work
from a Boston Museum, where the museum opted not to purchase theft insurance for the works).
86. See generally Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for
Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2439 (1994).
87. See Frequently Asked Questions, INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.intlCrime-areas/
Works-of-artFrequently-asked-questions (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
88. See Art Theft, FBI.GOV, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/vc-majorthefts
arttheft (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).
470 [Vol. 16:3:457
THEFTS, FRAUDS, AND FORGERIES
numerous private services endeavor to catalogue stolen works.8 9 The
Art Loss Register, for example, allows victims to publicize their stolen
works so that good citizens can report the location of discovered art, 90
and the IFAR provides a service to help putative buyers uncover
possible authenticity and titling issues.91
World War II-during which time nearly half the works housed
in Europe were stolen-was of particular importance to the history of
art theft.9 2 Thievery, in fact, preceded the fighting when the Nazi
Party formed the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg fur die Besetzten
Gebiete (ERR) to "acquire" or steal art predominantly from Jewish
collectors.9 3 The ERR would offer Jewish art owners nominal sums of
money for caches of priceless art, backing the proposition with threats
of violence, hollow promises of protection, and other forms of
coercion.9 4 Not surprisingly many sold or even abandoned their
collections so they could flee to regions outside of Nazi control.95 Once
the war began, the Nazis ransacked the art of each defeated country.96
The Germans were not the only perpetrators; Russian troops took
German art back to Eastern Europe 97 while Americans looted the Axis
nations.98
89. See About Us, ART LOSS REG., http://www.artloss.com/about-us (last visited Apr. 20,
2013); Zelcer, supra note 93.
90. See The Art Loss Register, http://www.artloss.com/en (last accessed April 20, 2013).
91. See The International Foundation for Art Research, http://www.ifar.org/, (last
accessed April 20, 2013).
92. See, e.g., THOMAS D. BAZLEY, CRIMES OF THE ART WORLD 84-85 (2010) ("For
example, one report places the losses suffered in France at 60,000 pieces, a figure that accounts
for one-third of all art in private hands in that country. A Polish database of artworks stolen or
missing incident to World War II contains 59,000 pieces and this number might only represent
10 percent of the artworks destroyed or stolen during that period .... "); Jeremy Epstein, The
Problems of Litigating WWII Art Restitution Claims, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL
FACULTY PODCAST (May 6, 2009) (downloaded using iTunes).
93. BAZLEY, supra note 92, at 89 ("In September 1940, Hitler established a specialized
unit known as the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR) whose mission was to seize those
works that were in concert with the cultural ideals of the Nazi regime and confiscate for sale or
destruction degenerate objects. This unit was head by the long-time Nazi loyalist and anti-
Semite, Alfred Rosenberg.").
94. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Fighting Corruption of the Historical Record: Nazi-
Looted Art Litigation, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 75, 87 (2012) ("Because the Nazis used many tactics to
mask involuntary transactions in a cloak of legality, documentation of such transactions should
be viewed with a cynical, historically informed eye .... From their very first days in power in
1933, the Nazis forced Jews to abandon their property in order to flee.... The Jews' loss of their
property as they fled 'for their lives was no more voluntary than the relinquishment of property
during a holdup."' (citing Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810 (1966))).
95. See id. at 87.
96. See BAZLEY, supra note 92, at 85 ("To be clear, the Nazis stole art from every
country they conquered.").
97. Id. at 92.
98. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 483, 485-86 (D.D.C. 1999)
(discussing a claim brought by Germans to reclaim photographs stolen by the U.S. Army at the
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Because some at that time assumed victorious armies could
rightfully plunder conquered lands 99-a practice that the international
community has disavowed for some time' 00-stolen works appeared
globally in galleries, museums, and private collections. 10 1  Many
beneficiaries saw nothing wrong with the process by which they
acquired stolen art and the good-faith purchasers thereof thought
little of scrutinizing the transaction; indeed, the norms of the art
world instructed dealers and buyers to refrain from questioning a
work's origin and transactional history. 02 In turn, any buyer of art
not dealing with the actual artist could potentially purchase stolen
goods; this is especially true of older works that thieves could have
stolen and fenced at any point during its existence.
While the law typically disfavors those who knowingly receive
stolen property, individual states have adopted various rules
regarding a good-faith purchaser for value, who had little way of
knowing whether a work was stolen. The common law of the state
where the painting lies usually controls the claim, each jurisdiction
abiding by the old English rule that one cannot transfer good title to
stolen property.'0 3 Most state laws concerning contracts for the sale of
goods follow the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which provides a
few exceptions to the common law rule. 104 The first exception imposes
conclusion of World War II, which was transported to the United States), affd in part, rev'd in
part 17 F. App'x 980 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
99. The Russians actually viewed plundered artwork as payment for the losses that
they suffered on the battlefield. BAZLEY, supra note 92, at 92.
100. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 81.1-12 (1966) (explaining that international
law allows armies to take "booty," defined as "property necessary and indispensable for the
conduct of war," while prohibiting plunder and pillage, defined as "the taking of private property
not necessary for the immediate prosecution of war").
101. See Kreder, supra note 94, at 75 ("Tales of venerated institutions, such as the
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), acquiring what they knew or should have known was trafficked
and laundered art may seem outrageous to those unaware of the infection of the market with art
that had been stolen or extorted from Jews between 1933 and 1945."); Barbara J. Tyler, The
Stolen Museum: Have United States Art Museums Become Inadvertent Fences for Stolen Art
Works Looted by the Nazis during World War II, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 441 (1999).
102. See Borodkin, supra note 73, at 386; see also Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10
(rejecting defendant's argument that a painting's former Jewish owners fled Germany and thus
"abandoned" the painting).
103. See Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B. Goldstein, A Tale of Two
Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith
Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 50 (1995) ("Anglo-American law is well-settled
that neither a thief nor a good faith purchaser from the thief, nor even subsequent good faith
purchasers, can pass good title. Indeed, the tort of conversion is unique in that it permits a
plaintiff to recover property or money damages from a defendant who is by definition innocent of
any wrongdoing ... ").
104. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003) (stating that a person with voidable title has power
to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value, any entrusting of possession of goods
to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the
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a limited warranty of title on all merchants unless the buyer knows
that the good is not being sold by its true owner or that the owner
claims to have only the ownership rights of a third person, unaware of
any prior sales and dealings. 10 5 The UCC also distinguishes situations
in which a good's owner created a scenario where a bona fide
purchaser would not suspect a lineage problem.106 For example,
section 2-403 allows title to pass to a good-faith purchaser of value
when the original owner has given the "indicia of ownership" to a third
party who then sells for value. 10 7 In that case, the original owner's
cause of action would be against the intermediary but not the
subsequent purchaser.108 Title can also pass if the owner entrusts a
"merchant who deals in goods of that kind" with a good and that
merchant then sells it.109 The policy rationale is that the law must
allow consumers to rely upon reputable dealers, and thus the original
owner must accept blame when putting a dealer in position to commit
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business, and entrusting includes any delivery and any
acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the
parties); Uniform Commercial Code Locator, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/
uniformlucc.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
105. U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (2003) ("A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or
modified only by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell only such right or
title as he or a third person may have.").
106. The UCC specifies:
(1) A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value .... (2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in ordinary course of business. (3) 'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any
acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between
the parties ....
U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003).
107. See id.
108. See, e.g., Zendman v. Harry Winston, Inc., 111 N.E.2d 871, 872 (N.Y. 1953)
(concluding that a diamond merchant who sent a ring without the intention of passing title to a
corporation conducting auctions could not recover the ring once it was sold to a the bona fide
purchaser who had purchased the ring for full value and in entire good faith).
109. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003); see also id. § 1-201(b)(9) ('Buyer in ordinary course of
business' means a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates
the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a
pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods in the ordinary
course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of
business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller's own usual or customary practices.").
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harm.110 Again, the owner's cause of action would be against the
intermediary, not the bona fide purchaser for value.111
Although these appear to be simple rules, significant legal
questions arise from the culture of art ownership. Most art owners
store their works at home or in venues not open to the public,
especially if the work has been stolen. 1 2 This has frustrated attempts
by victims of theft to locate their stolen works; in fact, it is often the
original owner's heir or devisee who learns of the work's subsequent
whereabouts decades or generations later.113 And upon discovery, the
new owner is frequently an innocent purchaser, long removed from the
art's theft, raising the question of when the law should estop theft
victims from asserting ownership over a stolen work. 114 This is a
classic conflict of two innocents.11 5
The states have dealt with this question differently. The first
approach is strict adherence to the common law rule that a thief
cannot pass good title allowing victims of theft to always sue for
replevin.11 6 In the infamous case Porter v. Wertz,1 17 the defendant
110. See Zendman, 111 N.E.2d at 875 ("In resolving this conflict, the courts have evolved
certain principles 'akin to estoppel' based on the maxim that 'As between two innocent victims of
the fraud, the one who made possible the fraud on the other should suffer."' (internal citation
omitted)).
111. See, e.g., id. at 877 (ruling based upon the UCC's common law origin, that the
original owner of a diamond ring could not pursue an action against the good-faith purchaser
after entrusting the ring to an intermediary). The court observed:
An owner must be fully aware of the potentialities for fraud created when, for
purposes of sale, he entrusts merchandise to a retail dealer, regularly engaged in
selling such goods, and the dangers are many times multiplied if that dealer happens
to be an auctioneer. It ill behooves the owner to complain if he is not permitted to rely
upon his private and secret agreement, when he himself has failed to require strict
adherence to its terms and has thus become responsible for the dealer's apparent
authority to sell.
Id.
112. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes Over
the Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles 11 (Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. For Law &
Econs., Working Paper No. 40, 1996), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files
files/40.posner.pdf (explaining that those possessing stolen work have an incentive to hide it so
the original purchaser cannot bring an act of replevin).
113. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 682 (2004) (stating that after
the original owners fled Germany and the Holocaust, their descendants located some of the
stolen art over fifty years later and brought suit).
114. For a discussion of this question, see generally Hawkins, Rothman & Goldstein,
supra note 103.
115. See id. at 50.
116. See, e.g., Naftgzer v. Am. Numismatic Soc'y, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 784, 788 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) ("[Nlaftzger is innocent of any wrongdoing and was unaware of the theft when he
purchased the coins. Even if Naftzger is an innocent purchaser, however, he did not acquire valid
title to the coins, assuming they were stolen, because a thief cannot transfer valid title. On this
record, Naftzger's obligation to return the coins will be established if and when the museum
proves the coins are its stolen property.").
117. Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500 (N.Y. 1981).
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purchased a stolen painting and then sought to estop its true owner
from retrieving it, arguing that because the art industry's customs
forbid inquiring into a painting's history, his own actions were
blameless. 118 The court found that the defendant purchased the work
from a seller who best fit the description of delicatessen
employee-not a reputable merchant-and that the law imposes a
duty on buyers to act in good faith, which may require an exercise of
due diligence.11 9 Indeed, when the court found that the defendant had
not done enough to investigate the painting's title, Porter imposed a
standard of conduct on the art industry which had not previously
existed.120
Against this backdrop, the general rules for an art transaction
are that reputable dealers sell goods with warranties of both
authenticity and title lasting for a set number of years unless they
disavow any warranty at the time of its sale. 121  Generally no
warranties exist for appraisal errors as this nearly always constitutes
a matter of opinion, which the UCC does not protect.1 22 Works sold by
private individuals come with no warranties unless expressly given in
the sale.' 23 This framework incentivizes buyers to transact with
reputable dealers only; however, the majority of art sales still flow
through informal channels, potentially because of the premium one
must pay to the reputable dealer for these same warranties.
1 24
Others courts, however, have considered arguments based
upon statutes of limitations and other equitable defenses.1 25 New
York follows the demand-and-refusal rule, which states that the
statute of limitations begins only when the theft victim learns of the
painting's location. 126 Thus, a thief or subsequent owner who conceals
a painting cannot rely upon a statute of limitations defense against
118. See id. at 502.
119. See id.
120. See Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the
Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 549, 588 (1999) (discussing how Porter represented a departure from the method that
the art industry had previously used to conduct business).
121. See, e.g., Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1573 (D. Haw.
1990).
122. See U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (20); Balog, 745 F. Supp. at 1563.
123. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (2003).
124. See Interview with William G. Pearlstein, supra note 51.
125. See, e.g., Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300, 309 (D.R.I. 2007); Hui Qun
Zhao v. Yu Qui Wang, No. 10-CV-1758(JMA), 2013 WL 269034, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(concluding that in an act of replevin under New York law, the three-year statute of limitation is
firm and no equitable toiling exists, which in fact gives more leniency to the one who converted
the good than to a good-faith purchaser).
126. See Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 430 (N.Y. 1991).
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the true owner. 127 In O'Keeffe v. Snyder,128 a New Jersey court added
the requirement that during the time when the owner had not located
the stolen painting, the owner must have exercised due diligence,'
29
whereas New York places no such burden on the owner. 130
Other equitable defenses available to new owners include
laches and adverse possession. Laches is a common law claim that
allows a defendant to keep a contested work if conduct by or on behalf
of the victim prejudiced the new owner.1 3' Adverse possession alleges
that the new owner possessed the painting openly and explicitly,
creating a new title in the owner. 132 This requires the new owner to
display the work publicly, such as in a museum, and assert ownership
over it for a specified period time, effectively estopping the original
owner from asserting a legal or possessory claim.'
33
In short, one who purchases a stolen work might have to return
it without compensation. This encourages patrons to thoroughly
research ownership history, though the art market's traditional
secrecy has limited the availability of such information. 134 A work's
chain of title is embodied in its provenance, which lists those who
owned a work, but not typically the specific years during which it was
owned.135 Even absent theft, almost all provenances of older works
include missing information, preventing possible buyers from
determining whether a particular gap is a product of ordinary secrecy
or evidence of theft.1 36 If a work lacks a formal enumeration of
owners, especially in circumstances when one family continuously
owned a work, buyers and sellers must rely upon suggestive evidence,
such as wills, letters, pictures, newspaper articles, journal entries, or
any other historical document.1 37 A work going unchallenged for a
127. Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty
Picture, 43 DUKE L.J. 337, 345 (1993).
128. 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
129. Id. at 870.
130. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
131. See, e.g., Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 529 F. Supp. 2d 300, 309 (D.R.I. 2007) ("A court
applying the defense of laches applies a two part test: (1) there must be negligence on the part of
the plaintiff that leads to a delay in the prosecution of the case, and (2) the delay must prejudice
the defendant. What constitutes laches depends on the circumstances of each particular case.
The prejudice may come from 'loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities and other
causes."') (citations omitted).
132. Hayworth, supra note 127, at 345.
133. Id. at 349 n.59.
134. See Turner, supra note 25, at 355-56.
135. See Interview with Ronald Spencer, supra note 81 (discussing the incentives about
secrecy and the fear of theft).
136. See id.
137. See Bruce W. Burton, In Search of John Constable's the White Horse: A Case Study
in Tortured Provenance and Proposal for a Torrens -Like System of Title Registration for Artwork,
476 [Vol. 16:3:457
2014] THEFTS, FRAUDS, AND FORGERIES 477
century possibly indicates that it possesses a clean title, but heirs and
descendants can, and have, returned years later to seek the return of
a lost work. 138 Indeed, stolen art often resembles those with clean
titles, frustrating attempts by good-faith buyers to guarantee an
unchallenged purchase.
139
Making matters worse, it is easy to bring a lawsuit alleging to
be the true owner of a painting, the effect of which creating a cloud
over the work's title. 140 A work loses almost all marketability, and
thus value, when others potentially assert a claim over it as few
buyers wish to litigate a replevin claim or even possibly risk losing the
work. 141 Because few artworks possess such value worth litigating,
these disputes often settle.
142
In sum, because theft has ravaged the art industry, its
response has been to increase secrecy. 143 A work with a strong
provenance comes at a premium; as a provenance becomes cloudier, its
59 FLA. L. REV. 531, 540 (2007) ("As is often the case with older masterpieces, the chain of
ownership would necessarily rely upon exploring a wide variety of letters, journals, auction
catalogs with their marginal entries, press accounts, diaries, private memoirs, or such probate
records as might still exist. Such evidence must be uncovered, its own genuineness established,
and assessed in the light of other tested information. In short, a squad of experts including
formal and informal archivists, art historians, museum curators, expert connoisseurs, and
biographers must be brought into play before a conclusive decision can be formed.") (internal
footnotes omitted).
138. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2004) (explaining
that the Austrian government confiscated the painting during World War II and that the suit to
reclaim it was brought by the origin owner's descendants, eventually arriving at the Supreme
Court in 2004).
139. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (involving a good faith
purchaser who ended up purchasing a stolen painting at a Sotheby's auction).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 99 Civ. 2622(BSJ), 2001 WL
88226, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001) (noting that the claim, alleging possible theft in the
painting's chain of title, may have only been brought by the plaintiff to cloud the work's title, and
that nothing about the work's history suggests impropriety).
141. See Burton, supra note 137, at 573 n.219; Jeffrey Orenstein, Comment, Show Me the
Monet: The Suitability of Product Disparagement to Art Experts, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 905, 914
(2005).
142. See Epstein, supra note 92. Several cases suggest that plaintiffs have brought suit
with the intent of casting a shadow on a work's title; presumptively to receive a settlement. See,
e.g., Fireman's Fund, 2001 WL 88226, at *5 ("Sait seeks to discover facts relating to the
Dannenberg Galleries' title to the painting, vaguely asserting that the gallery owner had a
reputation for being dishonest, presumably in order to cloud Lifton's title to the painting. As
discussed above, all of the indicia surrounding the sale of the painting to Lifton demonstrate a
bona fide purchase conveying good title."); see also Solomon v. Cutler, No. 2:07-cv-645-RLH-PAL,
2010 WL 3909980, at *5 (D. Nev. Apr. 8, 2010) (finding that a former owner has brought claim
over a painting with seemingly no merit in his action). IFAR provides excellent research of art
litigation. Of particular importance, as noted by IFAR, is that it contains some information on
out of court settlements. These type of agreements exist in significant quantities, yet are
infrequently accessible to the public. See Case Law, IFAR, http://www.ifar.org/
caselaw.php?ID=l (last visited Apr. 29, 2013) (subscription required).
143. See Sarah S. Conley, International Art Theft, 13 WIS. INT'L L.J. 493, 496 n. 15 (1995).
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value diminishes.144 When a work's provenance suggests that it has
been stolen-such as a work that survived World War II with no
ownership history-some buyers will still purchase it, but for a steep
discount and under the assumption that it can never be displayed
publicly. 145 This is true even for works that, while never having
actually been stolen, lack sufficient titling due to the desire of prior
owners to conduct business secretly. 146 Importantly, all future sales
must be done quietly to keep the possibly ill-gotten works out of the
public's eye. 147 The sad irony is that the art market's transactional
secrecy has become both a cause and effect of art theft, further
reducing the sum of information upon which a consumer may rely.
C. Information and the Risks Found in Attribution
Thievery is not the only undesirable behavior affecting the art
market, as the lack of warranties or guarantees accompanying many
art transactions mandates that any hopeful purchaser guarantee a
work's most essential quality, i.e., its authenticity.1 48 This takes on
several complex forms, all of which involving the process of
attribution. 149  Evidence of who originally created a painting,
especially when dealing with older works, is often lost. 150 Without
compelling evidence, experts must examine a number of
characteristics such as brush strokes, color, and content to determine
whether a specific master produced the work. 151 If Rothko experts
find that a painting belongs to, for instance, Rothko, then the group
will include the painting in Rothko's catalogue raisonn6, an
authoritative bibliography of an artist's work. 152 While exclusion from
144. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
145. See id.
146. See Turner, supra note 25, at 351-52.
147. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
148. See Ratil Jduregui, Comment, Rembrandt Portraits: Economic Negligence in Art
Attribution, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1947, 1948-52, 2027 (1997) (explaining that an art's attribution is
its most important and valued quality).
149. See id. at 1960-65.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. As Jeffrey Orenstein notes,
[a] catalogue raisonnj is an authoritative index of an artist's work, covering either the
artist's full oeuvre or a specific category of his works. It is an invaluable reference,
often containing detailed descriptions, history, and provenance for each work.
Primarily, however it is a list of all known works attributed to the artist. Therefore,
when the authors of a catalogue raisonn6 omit a work, they cast serious doubt on its
authenticity and profoundly affect the work's marketability. As the attorney for a
leading art dealer put it, "if a work isn't going to be included in the catalogue, from a
commercial view it's the death of your painting."
Orenstein, supra note 141, at 914 (internal footnotes omitted).
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the catalogue raisonni does not definitively mean inauthenticity, for
the sake of marketability, it does.
153
Another similar issue occurs when an artist's "school" or, in the
case of Andy Warhol, "factory" created the piece.' 5 4 Historically,
artists employed pupils, other artists, and mentees to help produce the
paintings; sometimes the agents created an entire work under the
artist's supervision, while other times the principle and agent
combined efforts.1 55 In terms of attributing a work, standards and
opinions vary about to whom a piece should be credited when more
than one hand painted it.156 Said differently, what is the nature or
level of influence that an artist must contribute to constitute a
genuine work? Especially when dealing with old masters, evidence
detailing the process by which the school created the work is often
lost, and standards regarding what constitutes authenticity have
changed over generations; what passed as a genuine work centuries
ago may no longer qualify.
157
Further, highly skilled artists have created forgeries that
mimic preexisting works. 158 Art patrons should not underestimate
either the number of forgeries on the market or the probability of
purchasing one. 59  Elmyr de Hory alone painted and sold
approximately one-thousand forgeries in the styles of Matisse, Van
Gogh, and other celebrated masters. 160 Incredibly, the infamy of Hory
inspired other forgers, creating a market for fake Horys.
161
Determining whether a forger created a painting is actually
quite difficult; many replica paintings were created centuries ago, at
which time the experts attributed them to a master.162 Problems arise
153. See Gareth S. Lacy, Standardizing Warhol: Antitrust Liability for Denying the
Authenticity of Artwork, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 185, 190 (2011) ("Auction houses face
considerable liability regarding the authenticity of artwork sold on secondary markets and will
often refuse to sell work excluded from an artist's catalogue raisonng. In other words,
authentication is as much a product of market consensus as expert or scholarly inquiry.").
154. See Jiuregui, supra note 148, at 1956, 1962.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1957-58.
158. See JONATHON KEATS, FORGED: WHY FAKES ARE THE GREAT ART OF OUR AGE 12-13,
50-66 (2013) (observing that many forgers are actually more technically skilled than the original
artists who they have copied).
159. See Liz Weiss & Julie Zeveloff, Eight of the Biggest Art Forgeries of All Time, BUS.
INSIDER (July 5, 2011, 4:57 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/art-forgeries-2011-6
(demonstrating the prevalence of high quality forgeries available on the market).
160. Id.
161. See Jesse Hamlin, Master (Con) Artist / Painting Forger Elmyr de Hory Copies are
Like the Real Thing, S.F. CHRON. (July 29, 1999), http://www.sfgate.com/entertainment/
article/Master-Con-Artist-Painting-forger-Elmyr-de-2917456.php.
162. See Jiuregui, supra note 148, at 1955-58.
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when the work comes under scrutiny today, pulling the figurative rug
out from under a good-faith purchaser.163 Even if a work is legitimate,
questions raised by experts about a work's authenticity can still create
a cloud over its title. 164 In turn, lawsuits have arisen where art
owners allege that experts damaged a work's marketability by
rendering a negative finding about its authenticity.'6 5 While some of
these suits seek to remedy genuine harm caused by negligent
attribution, others are meritless attempts by frustrated owners to
salvage their investment.' 66  For example, in United States v.
Fireman's Fund,167 the court posited that the only reason the plaintiff
brought suit challenging a painting's provenance was to create a cloud
over its title to diminish its marketability.'
68
The attribution process raises several important legal
questions, the first of which arises when a buyer learns that a
purchased work is actually a high-quality forgery. While one who
knowingly sells a forged good claiming that it is an original has
committed fraud,169 the law is murkier where the seller had no
knowledge of a work's lack of authenticity. Confusion mounts when
several innocent parties have bought and sold the forged work at the
163. See id. at 1957-58, 2017 ("Tragically, every time [amongst the centuries when] the
threshold is tightened, the feat of attribution becomes more difficult and the master's oeuvre
diminishes because the art expert-and the law that incorporates the expert's views-has
adopted a standard in contradiction to a fundamental reality of the production process of the
studio piece [at the time when it was painted].").
164. See PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW 483 (3d ed.
2012); see, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, No. 08-10097-RWZ, 2009 WL
6506658, at *1 (D. Mass. 2009) (noting that Museum asked court to declare owner of painting
and to bar defendant from continuing to sue over it, so that the court could remove the "cloud"
over its title).
165. See, e.g., Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 21 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2009) (noting that plaintiff sued after defendant refused to include painting in an
author's catalogue raisonnd which essentially signaled that the work was not marketable); Peter
Kraus, The Role of the Catalogue Raisonnd in the Art Market, in THE EXPERT VERSUS THE
OBJECT 63, 69-71 (Ronald D. Spencer ed., 2004); Ronald D. Spencer, The Risk of Legal Liability
for Attributions of Visual Art, in THE EXPERT VERSUS THE OBJECT, supra, at 143, 169-70.
166. See, e.g., Thome, 890 N.Y.S.2d at 21; United States v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No.
99 Civ. 2622(BSJ), 2001 WL 88226, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001).
167. Fireman's Fund, 2001 WL 88226, at *5.
168. Id.
169. Under New York law, for instance, one who purchases a forgery can press a fraud
claim against the dealer if the buyer can satisfy the following elements: "(1) false
representation(s) of (2) material fact with (3) intent to defraud thereby [scienter] and (4)
reasonable reliance on the representation (5) causing damage to plaintiff." Foxley v. Sotheby's
Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying the plaintiffs claim for fraud when the
plaintiff bought a forgery from an auction house because the auction house appears to have made
no misrepresentations about the painting's authenticity).
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price of an authentic.1 70 Which party should bear the lost value
between its purchase price and its current value: the current owner,
the original seller, or some party in between? Furthermore, the
discovery of a forgery often occurs years after a work's last purchase,
raising the question of when the law should estop a purchaser from
bringing suit.1
71
The primary statutory scheme controlling who assumes the
burden of a transaction involving a forgery comes from the UCC,
which enumerates when a seller has statutorily provided a warranty.
Section 2-313 instructs that a seller who vouches for a work's
authenticity by making either an "affirmation of fact or promise" or
providing a "description of the goods which is made part of the basis of
the bargain" creates a legally recognizable promise to the buyer; no
words of art, such as "warrant" or "guarantee," are necessary.
172
Indeed, under certain conditions, words that seemingly establish an
express warranty may not actually bind the seller173 as some courts
require the seller to have made comments about the work's legitimacy
unless the buyer relied on the express statements or the seller used
them to induce the deal.174 For instance, in Rogath v. Sibernmann,
75
the court examined whether one who mistakenly bought a forged
painting could bring suit against the dealer if the buyer had
knowledge that an expert had once challenged its authenticity. 176 The
court reasoned that a buyer who has made a calculated deal should
not be able to hold the dealer liable as an insurer for her
misjudgment. 177 Moreover, subsection (2) of UCC section 2-313 limits
a seller's liability when her statements constitute "an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be
merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not
create a warranty."
178
170. See, e.g., id. at 1227, 1233 (involving a question where a painting bore indicia that it
had been forged, though none of the parties had substantial proof).
171. New York puts a six-year statute of limitations on fraud claims, starting two years
after the owner discovers that the painting is a forgery, or should have so realized. See Foxley,
893 F. Supp. at 1231.
172. U.C.C. § 2-313 (2003).
173. See Foxley, 893 F. Supp. at 1233.
174. See, e.g., id. at 1228.
175. 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997).
176. Id. at 265.
177. See id. ("In short, where the seller discloses up front the inaccuracy of certain of his
warranties, it cannot be said that the buyer-absent the express preservation of his rights-
believed he was purchasing the seller's promise as to the truth of the warranties. Accordingly,
what the buyer knew and, most importantly, whether he got that knowledge from the seller are
the critical questions.").
178. U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (2003).
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If a seller refrains from making a claim about a work's
authenticity, then section 2-314 imposes an implied warranty of
authenticity (or merchantability) if the seller is "a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind."' 79 Under this section, the goods must be
"fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used," 180
although the seller may strip the works of all warranties expressed
and implied 181 by selling them "as is" under section 2-316.182
The UCC statute of limitations, however, limits the period
during which a buyer may file suit to four years from the time of the
work's purchase-not from when the buyer learns of its lack of
authenticity. 183 The policy rationale is to encourage buyers to verify
paintings' authenticity quickly.184  For example, in Krahmer v.
Christies,185 the Delaware court held that the plaintiffs could not bring
a breach of warranty claim because the auction house provided a
six-year warranty, putting the buyers on notice that they must
investigate the work during that period. 86 Though there are a few
situations where the law provides the buyer with extra safeguards,
such as when the seller continues to act in a manner causing the
buyer to believe that the good is authentic. 187 Such seller action resets
the statute of limitations either to when the buyer learned of the
179. Id. § 2-314.
180. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
181. Id. § 2-316 (1), (3). Section 2-315 also stipulates that an implied warranty of
authenticity attaches to a good in which the seller has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose. Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1563 n.16 (D. Haw. 1990).
This section though, infrequently applies to art since there are few special purposes in which art
may be "used." Id. (explaining why section 2-315 can rarely be used by one who buys a
forgery).The court explained:
Comment 2 to § 2-315 states that "a particular purpose differs from the ordinary
purpose for which the goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer
which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes for
which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of merchantability and go to
uses which are customarily made of the goods in question." With this comment as a
guide, it would appear that neither a museum nor a private collector could invoke § 2-
315's implied warranty for its protection, since the use of artwork for display or
investment are customary uses for such items, or else are those which would not be
particular to the purchaser's business.
Id.
182. U.C.C. § 2-316 (3) (2003).
183. Id. § 2-725(1).
184. See Krahmer v. Christie's Inc., 903 A.2d 773, 781 (Del. Ch. 2006).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 783.
187. See Balog v. Ctr. Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556, 1572 (D. Haw. 1990)
(explaining that future warranties provided by the dealer constituted express warranties and
thus, restarted the statute of limitations clock).
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forgery or to the date of the seller's last communication.18 8 Also, in
some situations the seller may have a special fiduciary relationship
with the buyer that creates a common law obligation of good dealing
beyond what the UCC requires.
18 9
The problems of attribution and authenticity have further
diminished the market efficiency of the art trade. Investigating the
authenticity of a work is difficult and costly in part because of the
degree to which purchasers must rely upon experts. 190 This process
has been made even more difficult by the legal liability threatening
those brave enough to offer an expert authenticity opinion.1 91 Because
many buyers sue experts for product disparagement 192 or defamation
of title193 for diminishing a work's value by asserting inauthenticity,
those buyers who need expert advice often cannot obtain it as experts
have become fearful of potential litigation. 94 Moreover, art experts
occasionally work for the dealer, nearly guaranteeing a finding of
authenticity despite evidence suggesting otherwise.1 95 Not only does
this dupe the buyer, but it floods the market with bad information.
Other times, the parties will conduct a secret transaction so that if an
188. See id.
189. See Hope v. Klabal, 457 F.3d 784, 791-92 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that no fiduciary
relationship existed when an owner of art that turned out to be forged brought suit against
dealer, claiming, in part, that the deal violated his fiduciary duty even though the two parties
had conducted business previously because a relationship of added trust and "protection" must
arise).
190. See generally Orenstein, supra note 141 (explaining the role, necessity, and
intricacies of art experts in many art transactions).
191. See Interview with Ronald Spencer, supra note 81. See generally Spencer, The Risk
of Legal Liability for Attributions of Visual Art, supra note 165, at 143-80 ('This chapter
examines the six legal claims most usually made against experts-academic and independent art
scholars, art dealers, museum curators, and others-who make decisions about the attribution of
visual art.").
192. See, e.g., Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 27-28 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2009) (explaining that product disparagement is descended from slander of title and
allowing plaintiffs case to proceed because the expert's public statement of the inauthenticity of
a painting had "caused negotiations for the sale of the painting to be suspended and potentially
affected future sale possibilities"); see also Kirby v. Wildenstein, 784 F. Supp. 1112, 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1992).
193. See, e.g., Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P.3d 561, 576-77 (Mont. 2007) (involving an art
expert who sued a painting owner and a law firm for malicious prosecution and abuse of process
after the painting owner sued the expert). The art expert claimed that the painting was by the
hand of a different artist and thus the owner claimed that the expert had committed defamation
of title. Before bringing suit, the owner asserted that the expert could avoid litigation by
renouncing his opinion. Id.
194. See Interview with Ronald Spencer, supra note 81. See generally Spencer, The Risk
of Legal Liability for Attributions of Visual Art, supra note 165, at 143-85 (discussing the
required elements of legal claims typically asserted against art experts as well as the ways in
which art experts may raise defenses or conduct themselves to reduce the risk of liability).
195. See J.uregui, supra note 148, at 1966 (noting that France has sought to improve
attribution integrity by demanding that experts work independently, and not for the dealer).
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expert suspects a lack of authenticity, other buyers will never know of
this finding allowing the painting to be resold years later as if it were
authentic. 196
An equally pressing problem is the manner in which art
experts choose to include a work within an author's catalogue
raisonn . A man recently found a cache of paintings in his attic
resembling Jackson Pollock's work;197 he even lived near where
Pollock once resided, further suggesting that he had lucked into a
fortune.'98 A similar event occurred when a woman bought a painting
at a thrift store, which some would later observe could be a Pollock.199
In both situations, those in control of the catalogue raisonni
disagreed, refusing to include the works in Pollock's official listing.200
Accusations have since surfaced that many of the experts working for
the catalogue raisonn owned Pollocks and, in turn, that certifying the
found works would have increased the supply of Pollocks, thereby
diminishing the value of the experts' collections.20' In other words, the
committee labored under powerful incentives to deny the paintings'
authenticities.
In sum, determining the authenticity of a work is quite
difficult. 20 2 Many of those best able to provide reliable information
refuse to do so, while others may even intentionally provide bad
information. Because a work's authenticity and attribution are the
essence of its value, the art market's inability to provide reliable
information about attribution is quite troubling.
IV. THE INEFFICIENCIES OF THE ART MARKET
While the nature of the art market resembles few other
industries, this by itself is neither good nor bad. A problem only
196. See Patricia Cohen, Fake Art May Keep Popping up for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1 1/06/arts/design/murky-laws-give-fake-artworks-a-future-
as-real-ones.html ("The artwork on the wall had been previously identified by the artist's estate
as fake Richard Diebenkorns. But here they were again, proudly displayed as Diebenkorns by a
new owner who had no idea he had bought discredited drawings.").
197. See Louise Jury, A Load of Old Pollocks? Thirty-two "Works' Found in an Attic Now




199. See Georgina Adam, Thorny Issues, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:25 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2e079e514-1068-1 lel-8010OO144feabdcO.html.
200. See id.; Jury, supra note 197.
201. See Adam, supra note 199. See generally Lacy, supra note 153 (explaining that some
purchasers have brought anti-trust claims against the expert committees who authenticate for
catalogue raisonnis).
202. See Adam, supra note 199.
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arises when the current legal regime has neglected to account for the
unique qualities of art and the history of its trade. First, the UCC and
most state laws generally seek to encourage buyers to purchase
commodities that are free of titling issues, shielding purchasers from
liability if they buy new items from reputable dealers. 20 3 These
schemes neglect to recognize that the majority of works over a couple
decades old must be sold on the secondary market and due to the
industry's secrecy, almost all of them include titling gaps. In other
words, the legal regime requires a level of information that almost
never exists. Because buyers and sellers cannot possibly adjust their
behavior to what the law demands, they have instead increased
secrecy and other undesirable behaviors that contribute to market
failures.
Efficient markets maximize the value of the goods traded in
them. 20 4 In contrast, for example, a law that forbids homeowners from
using their houses as collateral for loans would be inefficient because
the value of homes would plummet. Further, market actors who
depend upon the real estate market-including builders, contractors,
bankers, real estate agents, and lawyers-would lose substantial
amounts of business. Economist Hernando De Soto explains that the
poverty found in many countries is rooted in their legal systems'
needless creation of "dead capital," whereby markets cannot rely upon
the primary value of its assets.20 5 Similarly, the inefficiencies of the
art market have systematically destroyed the value of its commodities.
Paintings with good titling sell for a certain value, while larger gaps in
the title diminish the work's price. 206 Some paintings, depending upon
their attribution or history of titling, have almost no value despite
being fantastic works of art.20 7 For devaluation to occur, it is not
necessary that a work has been stolen, only that it might have been.
208
Thus, the art market drowns in a veritable reservoir of dead capital.
Yet another issue stems from buyers incurring high transaction
costs to purchase a painting. Even when a work is legitimate, the
amount of research required to verify titling, authenticity, attribution,
203. See supra Part 1II.2.B.
204. See supra Part II.
205. See DE SOTO, supra note 5, at 30-35, 39-40 (explaining that the failure of countries
to properly title land prevents owners from harnessing its capital for the purpose of obtaining
credit).
206. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
207. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing that
Sotheby's suspended the sale of the painting because of the cloud created over the work's title).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 99 Civ. 2622(BSJ), 2001 WL
88226, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001) (noting a key issue was the cloud on the work's title,
preventing the work's sale).
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legal claims, et cetera, can add substantial costs on top of the asking
price. Additional costs of ownership result from safeguarding the
works against theft and forgery by purchasing either insurance or
warranties from the dealer. 209 Moreover, the value of most paintings
does not often warrant the costs inherent with litigation;210 so upon
finding that a work is fake or stolen, owners do not typically find that
it makes economic sense to either raise or fight a claim.
V. EXPLAINING THE ECONOMICS OF PERSISTENT MARKET FAILURE
The puzzle of the art market is not the market failure itself,
but its persistence. Why does market failure exist in equilibrium
when the emergence of market failure and dead capital should prompt
those who would benefit from increased efficiency to advocate and
effectuate some level of change, regulation, or supervision?211 With
respect to the art world, the problem has not been that aggrieved
actors have tried and failed to change this market's culture but
instead that all parties appear content.212 In fact most dealers and
patrons adamantly defend the traditional ways in which they have
sold and traded art.
213
The state of the art trade suggests that markets for goods can
exist in a state of failure if the preferences of the buyers and sellers
are too aligned. As stated above, it is assumed that all necessary
information regarding a good's market value will arise when a
sufficient number of buyers and sellers interact in the market place. 214
The key is that during negotiations, the parties must haggle at arm's
length where buyers seek the lowest possible price and sellers demand
the highest. The price that results should reflect the good's market
value. 215 If either the buyers or sellers perceive that the manner in
which the market sells goods allows one group to exploit the other, a
209. See, e.g., Art Title Insurance, ARIS, http://www.aristitle.com (last visited Apr. 30,
2012) (providing an insurance plan to guard against adverse titling claims).
210. Epstein, supra note 92.
211. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 716-17 (explaining that there is a market for
legislation-societal groups lobby and spend resources to influence legislators to produce laws
that are likely to increase the group's utility or to reduce perceived harms).
212. See Robin Pogrebin & Kevin Flynn, As Art Values Rise, So Do Concerns About
Market's Oversight, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/arts/design/as-
art-market-rise-so-do-questions-of-oversight.html ("Many in the art world insist there is no need
for further scrutiny of a market that prompts few consumer complaints and is vital to the New
York economy.").
213. See, e.g., Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. 1981) (noting that the
defendant argued that the industry's culture forbids a buyer from inquiring into a work's
history).
214. See supra Part II.
215. See supra Part II (explaining the process by which a good receives its value).
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demand for corrective legislation should arise (e.g., supervision or
regulation).216 It is this adversarial relationship between the buyers
and sellers that creates both the efficient trade of goods and the
imposition of rules and standards encouraging fair dealings.
What differentiates the art market and encourages its
inefficiency lies in the probability that art will appreciate in value.
This strips the art trade of a key adversarial quality and causes the
preferences of art buyers and sellers to align. Consider again a more
traditional market: constant advancements in technology and
subsequent usage diminish a television's value from the moment it is
initially sold. One who would like to resell a television can generally
hope to only receive a moderate fraction of its original purchase price,
as televisions are rarely bought as an investment. In turn, those who
intend to purchase a television should prefer a market that is
particularly favorable to buyers, considering that under almost no
circumstances would a buyer benefit from a situation in which dealers
possess an inequitable sum of leverage over the buyers.
Art differs substantially from these more traditional goods in
that art ownership does not drain a work of its economic value; in fact,
most buyers have some knowledge or expectation that their purchase
will appreciate while it sits on a wall. The most direct way to realize
the work's increasing value is to later resell it.217 The key is that
buyers can foresee a day when they swap roles and become the seller
in hopes of receiving more for the good than what they paid. 218 In
other words, buyers often view the art market from the perspective of
the sellers, harboring their interests.
21 9
Indeed, as previously discussed, the inequitable and unchecked
conduct of the sellers and buyers largely has caused the art trade's
market failure.220 Buyers have failed to demand greater oversight
because they expect that, at some point in the future, they can take
advantage of these same market inefficiencies. Since art generally
216. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 716-17 (describing the marketplace for legislation).
217. Selling art is the most traditional method to capitalize on increased value, although
other methods exist. For instance, one can collateralize a piece of art in procuring a loan. See
Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin Bauer, Protecting Property Rights and Unleashing Capital
in Art, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 881, 921-22 (2011) ("The collateralization of art and antiquities has
recently grown in popularity, particularly in response to the current economic downturn. In
2008, renowned photographer Annie Leibovitz, known in legal circles for her copyright suit
against Paramount Pictures regarding a nude photo that she took of pregnant actress Demi
Moore, borrowed over fifteen million dollars secured by, among other things, 'the rights to all of
her photographs."').
218. See Lauren A.E. Schuker, Art's Anxiety Attack, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2007, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB119041430260835718.
219. See id.
220. See supra Part III.
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appreciates in value, consumers can enjoy a significant profit on a
work's more expensive resale than what was lost on the initial
purchase. For example, if the art market's inefficiency inflates the
average sale price of art by 10 percent, then one who purchases a
painting for one-hundred dollars (and thus, overpays by ten dollars)
can hope to recoup that ten dollars plus plenty more after it
appreciates in value to one-thousand dollars. In this case the buyer
enjoys a one-hundred-dollar markup minus the ten-dollar loss. Said
differently, it appears that buyers have accepted the inequitable
leverage wielded by sellers because they not only see themselves
becoming a seller in the future, but because they expect to benefit
more from selling the work than they will lose as its buyer.
In turn, art consumers have accepted, for example, the fdct
that no duty obligates sellers to provide prospective consumers with
adverse appraisals that suggest that the work is a forgery. 221 This
acquiescence would be counterintuitive in other markets, considering
that a prospective television buyer would almost always benefit from a
safeguard preventing sellers from selling a knockoff. Here, though,
buyers foresee that they will potentially sell the work and thus have
plenty to lose if an expert later determines that the work was forged
after the UCC's warranties have expired. Buyers have, it seems,
chosen to accept the fact that a dealer may have buried adverse
opinions because they may later need to do so as well.
The upshot of this dynamic is that the preferences of buyers
and sellers are now aligned to such a degree that neither party has an
incentive to demand increased efficiency. Despite the lack of protest
from the art community, its culture of trade has created substantial
societal harms by fostering thievery and the silent trade of fenced
works. In other circumstances, traditionally accepted shady dealings
have created clouds on titles that rendered precious works almost
valueless.22 2 Moreover, the manner in which dealers actively suppress
reliable valuation information has caused patrons to spend extraneous
resources that they could have invested in other industries,
benefitting additional vendors.
Importantly we should probably expect similar dynamics in
most other industries where buyers and sellers are not properly
adversarial. The real estate market currently enjoys substantial
regulation, possibly due to the potential for graft and abuse. While
221. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 99 Civ. 2622(BSJ), 2001 WL
88226, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001).
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substantially less studied, the markets for diamonds, weapons, drugs,
trademarks, and others present similar concerns. 223
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Because most art traders face powerful incentives to conceal
information about a work's value, provenance, and authenticity,
reforms should consider methods that encourage buyers, sellers, and
dealers to be more forthright. The current legal regime reinforces the
inefficiencies of the current system; therefore, proposed amendments
should focus on changing the law so that communicating relevant
information will no longer place a speaker in peril. This will help to
increase market efficiency by allowing market actors to more




A primary reason for the barriers to information flow and
resulting market inefficiencies is that aggrieved art owners have
chosen to file lawsuits against the art experts who have rendered
unfavorable opinions about their pieces. 225 Art experts are typically
the only ones with the knowledge and skill to attribute art and spot a
fake, but concerns about their legal liability have caused them to
withhold their opinions. 226 Indeed, the art market depends upon the
flow of necessary information, yet the reluctance of art experts to fill
this void has caused the art market to fall further into market failure.
However, providing qualified immunity for expert opinions could have
the opposite effect, as experts would have little incentive to provide
better than negligent assessments.2 27 A middle ground must be found.
Some in the art trade acknowledge the art market's
inefficiencies and attribute them in part to the fact that the private
art market (other than the public auction market) is, on the whole,
223. See, e.g., Edward Jay Epstein, Have You Ever Tried to Sell a Diamond?, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/issues/82feb/8202diamondl.htm; Eric Goldschein,
The Incredible Story of How De Beers Created and Lost the Most Powerful Monopoly Ever,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-de-beers-
2011-12?op=l.
224. See supra Part II (explaining the economics of efficient markets and their ability to
appropriately allocate resources).
225. See Sharon Flescher, The International Foundation for Art Research, in THE EXPERT
VERSUS THE OBJECT, supra note 165, at 95, 101.
226. See id. at 95.
227. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 213-15 (explaining that the price one is willing to
spend to avoid an accident is a function of the probability and magnitude of one's liability).
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less regulated and transparent than other significant markets. 228 In
France, for example, one can attribute work only upon receiving a
license from the French government. 29
Congress should create a similar objective art organization
tasked with compiling information about the art trade. An attribution
committee of experts would provide a service to art owners who
voluntarily seek an opinion. Each expert would be licensed and
certified to render an authoritative ruling about a work's authenticity
or proper attribution. All of the committee's experts would enjoy
immunity from defamation-of-title and product-disparagement
lawsuits, as long as they disclose any possible conflicts of interest.230
Aggrieved art owners could protest only about the process by which
the expert attributed the work was flawed, not the substance of the
expert's judgment. The art committee should then record all opinions
so that future buyers can rely upon already established rulings.
The advantage of utilizing the expert committee is that its
attribution process would incentivize those with authoritative and
reliable information to provide it.231 There is also no current process
that one must follow to become an expert; anyone who holds herself
out to be an authority can render an opinion to either validate or
defeat a work.232  This committee could help establish actual
authority, so that putative purchasers and sellers could rely upon the
committee's knowledge. Hopefully, such a committee would create
openly accessible institutional knowledge about existing artworks,
reducing the costs borne by future consumers and purchasers who
seek to investigate the piece.
228. See Interview with William G. Pearlstein, supra note 51.
229. See Jduregui, supra note 148, at 1996-97. JAuregui notes:
But how have the French professionalized their experts? The expert must obtain
certain qualifications to even enter the market, namely credentials-a license from a
recognized organization. French experts must belong to a professional association.
The experts' prestige stems from their membership in a particular association.
Induction into an association that deals exclusively in advising the courts, such as the
Union des Experts pros de la Cour d'Appel de Paris, brings the greatest prestige. In
1994, out of fifty applicants to the Union, only three became inductees. Not only do
magistrates themselves approve the appointment, but the expert also must already
belong to one of the professional associations in the field, whether court sanctioned or
not. Here again, prestige matters, because not all associations are as selective in their
membership.
Id.
230. For instance, an expert would have to disclose whether she owns works by the artist
for whom she is an expert or even works for a gallery or dealer specializing in that artist. See,
e.g., Adam, supra note 199.
231. Experts often refuse to provide expert opinions out of fear of liability. See Flescher,
supra note 225, at 101; supra Part III.C. Providing at least qualified immunity should nullify the
incentives to withhold information, creating a regime in which more reliable information will be
distributed. See Flescher, supra note 227, at 101.
232. See Interview with Franklin Feldman, supra note 11.
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Importantly, part of the reason why an expert committee would
probably be successful stems from the fact that art owners would only
submit works to it voluntarily. Buyers willing to spend substantial
sums of money would probably prefer, or even demand, that this
authoritative committee provide its authentication and attribution
services, as opposed to some more unknown expert chosen by the
seller. Sellers who eschew this service would likely raise a red flag,
suggesting a potential problem with the work. While today's system
provides few clues about the credibility of an opinion, this system
could provide a means by which buyers can assess a work's
authenticity without incurring the costs of engaging expensive
information gathering procedures which may be inherently unreliable
due to the influence of financial conflicts of interest. Those with
attributed works could submit their work to the expert committee
without fearing a negative finding. Upon a negative finding, buyers
would still be free to supplement the committee's assessment with
additional private assessments, although buyers would be on notice
that a government agency has deemed its authenticity to be
questionable.
Ideally, this process would also diminish what some art experts
have referred to as the "tyranny of the catalogue raisonn4."233 A
work's current marketability relies heavily upon its inclusion in its
author's catalogue raisonni, despite the fact that the importance of
such catalogues is a rather modern phenomenon and riddled with
conflict of interest problems. 23 4 Again, the experts who contribute to
the catalogue raisonni must pass no expertise test, often own many of
the artist's works, and, thus, have incredible incentives to deny
authenticity to works owned by others. 235 The probable reason for the
catalogue raisonng's importance stems from the lack of other
authoritative sources to authenticate and attribute. This commission
could reduce the art market's reliance on defective information
sources, such as the catalog raisonn , or at least shed additional light
onto the process by which art receives value.
233. Interview with William G. Pearlstein, supra note 51.
234. See Michael Findlay, The Catalogue Raisonn4, in THE EXPERT VERSUS THE OBJECT,
supra note 165, at 55, 55-58 ("In the long history of art, however, the catalogue raisonn6 is a
relatively recent entry.").
235. See Adam, supra note 199; Lacy, supra note 153, at 215-16.
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B. The Duty of the Dealer
Holding dealers accountable to those that they serve pursuant
to the law of agency would provide another important reform. 2
36
Currently, only auction houses that accept a work on consignment owe
a fiduciary duty to the owner. 237 This requires the auctioneer to serve
only the buyer's best interest. Many sellers, however, put their faith
in the dealer (who receives a handsome commission) to seek out the
best possible deal, ignorant to the fact that the dealer also works for
several buyers.238 Indeed, most dealers assume, per industry custom,
that they may play both sides without informing either. 239 Because
the dealer has essentially committed to receiving the highest price for
the seller and driving the hardest bargain for the buyer, a conflict of
interest results whereby at least one party will receive less than what
proper market efficiency would demand. 240 As a result, the law must
assume that dealers owe a principle-agent fiduciary duty to each party
with which they contract, unless the dealer clearly and explicitly
communicates the dealer's other business relationships and conflicts.
Most importantly, this would help bring important information
to light. If the dealer must treat buyers at arm's length, then the
dealer will face substantial incentives to find more buyers, one of
whom may possibly pay a higher price. Likewise, buyers often have to
rely on the dealer's opinion that a proposed transaction makes sense,
but dealers should be considered likely to conceal important
information about a work's provenance and authenticity if the
discovery and communication of such could sabotage a deal and hurt
the dealer's interests. In sum, current dealers cannot adequately
serve the interests of both the buyers and sellers; eliminating this
conflicted relationship would only help the flow of information and
market efficiency.
C. Insurance
Another reform that may improve the efficiency of the art
market is the promotion of art title insurance. Title insurance is a
236. See Patty Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art Market,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501, 557 (1988) (suggesting that the laws of agency could be useful to
resolving dealer conflicts).
237. See id.
238. See, e.g., Cohen, The New Blow in Art Clash of Titans, supra note 67.
239. See Randy Kennedy, Gagosian Suit Offers Rare Look at Art Dealing, N.Y. TIMES
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product-and a concept-that has only recently been introduced and
made generally available to the art market. 241 Title insurance is
gradually gaining acceptance in the art market as purchasers weigh
the cost of one-time premiums against the consequences of title
defects. 242 At the time of writing, ARIS is the only dedicated art title
insurance company, with the specialized capacity to base underwriting
decisions on provenance research. 243 Advantages of more wide spread
use of art title protection insurance would be numerous. First,
purchasing a policy would provide valuable information about the art
market to buyers, as ARIS must obtain sufficient reliable information
to assess the risks found in a work. Because experienced insurance
companies should become particularly adept at pricing risk, buyers
would not have to incur substantial personal costs to learn how to do
the same. Second, buyers may be more likely to invest in art if they
had a means to purchase title security. Third, ARIS or other
insurance agencies could share information about the works that they
have determined to be forgeries or stolen. Catalogued information
should help buyers to quickly determine a problematic painting and
also, prevent sellers from repeatedly endeavoring to resell that same
painting every few years.
D. Art-Theft Databases
Requiring that anyone bringing an act of replevin for a stolen
painting must provide notice of the theft to the art market would
produce even more desirable results. The current issue is that many
historic art transactions have occurred in secret and thus buyers or
sellers will never be able to determine who owned the work and
when.244 Many stolen works even resemble valid pieces. 245  Some
common law regimes that seek to remedy theft require the theft victim
to exercise due diligence to find that stolen work. 246 In light of the
development of services such as the Art Loss Register and IFAR,
which provide an adequate method to provide notice of a theft to
good-faith purchasers for value, the law should require this.
While it may seem inequitable to burden theft victims, the
manner by which provenances of older paintings inherently contain
holes indicates that the law should place the onus to report
241. See ARIS, http://www.aristitle.com (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
242. See Interview with William G. Pearlstein, supra note 51.
243. See About ARIS, ARIS, http://www.aristitle.com/content menu.php?id=30&
menuid=29 (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
244. See Turner, supra note 25, at 350-56.
245. See supra Part III.C.
246. See supra Part III.B.
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information on those who possess it.247 Unless a buyer has reason to
believe a work has been stolen, these reforms should insulate them
from replevin suits if the painting had been stolen for a significant
amount time, such as ten years, provided that the owner-the obvious
least-cost avoider-has not put putative buyers on notice. If the seller
could prove that she owned the painting for many continuous years,
buyers would know that others could not challenge their purchase.
Other benefits would be that this rule could eliminate expensive, stale
litigation and increase the flow of information. By incentivizing
sellers to record who owned a work and for how long, provenances will
begin to include more, and increasingly accurate, information.
Most importantly, this rule would accommodate the secret
history of the art trade. The current system punishes good-faith
buyers for acquiring art with provenance holes even though a
substantial amount of its transactional history has often been lost.
Currently, buyers can do no more than investigate the title, but rarely
do provenances include enough information to put a buyer on notice.
Requiring theft victims to report theft is a minimal burden for one
who endeavors to use the legal system to reclaim property. In
addition, this rule would maximize the value of legitimate art with
poor titling while destroying the marketability of those that have
actually been stolen.
VII. CONCLUSION
The general principles of law and economics indicate that the
art trade currently exists in a state of market failure. Efficient
markets require the flow of plentiful, easily accessible information; yet
the art market's general culture and the laws governing it encourage
those possessing and selling art to proceed with the utmost secrecy
and to withhold or distort information. Therefore, those who seek to
buy or sell art through a private dealer or auction house face
substantial peril-the work could be stolen, forged, or worth
considerably less than originally assumed. Because of this, significant
questions arise about why one would buy art, as opposed to allocating
resources to any other commodity.
This Article explores this question by first examining the art
market in greater detail and then providing solutions to the particular
problems identified. It recommends substantive reforms, including
Congress enacting art market regulation and creating a commission
on art attribution that could provide information and objective,
247. See supra Part 111.2 (explaining the circumstances that often create gaps in
provenances).
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authoritative expertise. Such a reform would remedy several common
practices that have led buyers and sellers to errantly believe that their
agents serve their interests. Additionally, titling and authenticity
insurance could help protect buyers and also supply information. The
author welcomes others to suggest methods to increase art market
efficiency, as the depth of its market failure has been understudied
and misunderstood.

